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 The Crypto-Colonial Dilemmas of Rattanakosin Island
Michael Herzfeld
It is now over a decade and a half since Marc Askew published an infl uential 
critique of the rise of heritage discourse in Bangkok (Askew 1996). In an argument 
that reverberates sympathetically with my own critique of modernist planning 
a decade later (Herzfeld 2006), he suggests that the current planning regime has 
chosen to ignore existing, on-the-ground social arrangements in favor of a Western-
derived and locally unappealing concept of “heritage,” now offi cially enshrined in 
state discourse as moradok haeng chaat (“national heritage”). While the term is 
etymologically cognate with the Lao moladok, its exponents in Thailand have never 
succeeded in promoting its potentially affective appeal in the way that has made 
signifi cant inroads in the Lao consciousness (Berliner 2010). 
In order to understand why the concept has so little appeal and how its 
implications nonetheless suffuse current urban politics in Bangkok, I propose in this 
brief exploration to address some key issues both from the intimate perspective of 
ethnographic research and through the telescopic lens of trans-national comparison. 
Through this typically anthropological convergence of apparently opposed 
viewpoints, I hope to tease out some traces of the key dynamics so long obscured by 
the myopic grandiloquence of formal historiography.
The conceptual dilemmas and practical diffi culties of promoting the idea 
of a national heritage in Thailand are exemplifi ed in Rattanakosin Island, where 
the imposing plans envisaged for the area’s reconstruction have been mired in 
bureaucratic foot-dragging, inter-agency rivalry, contradictions within the legal 
provisions for eminent domain and expropriation, and popular resistance. Some of 
the offi cial dreaming has simply been unrealistic, as in the continuing promotion of 
Ratchadamnoen Avenue as the “Champs-Elysées of Asia,” a throwback to the Phibun 
era (Wong 2006: 65) that was revived with considerable enthusiasm by Thaksin 
Shinawatra. That naked instance of emulation of the West, taken in contrast to the 
ongoing threat to the vernacular (as opposed to royal and religious) architecture 
of earlier times, would seem to suggest that an attitude of disdain for poor Thai 
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communities and the uncritical embrace of “Western” models of town planning and 
design are two sides of the same coin. But what do the attitudes that have shaped the 
offi cial face of the area look like from the perspective of people who actually live there?
There is little to suggest that these people – who represent a complex mixture of 
classes, religions (Muslims, Sikhs, Hindus, and Christians as well as Buddhists), and 
ethnic and regional backgrounds – evince any disaffection from the offi cial rhetoric 
of Thai national identity. Rather, they dispute the moral authority of its current 
representatives. Residents of some of the poorer communities in Rattanakosin 
Island, for example, complain that the BMA bureaucracy perpetuates the ideology of 
sakdina, the old feudal system with its distinctions between nobles and commoners. 
That charge may be a somewhat exaggerated invocation of history to explain away 
the often openly contemptuous stance of individual bureaucrats – a common device 
of critical discourse in Thailand (see Reynolds 1987: 150) – without admitting that 
the structure of the BMA bureaucracy is largely modeled instead on Western notions 
of city governance. Nonetheless, the contempt – or, at least, the indifference – is a 
reality; there are numerous civil servants in the BMA who care deeply about the 
fate of the urban poor, but they are collectively described as not being “the people 
with power” (phuu mii amnaat) and they exercise little if any infl uence on the way 
in which poorer residents are treated by the institution as a whole. On the other 
side of the fence, that perceived lack of sympathy and respect provokes a matching 
rhetoric from community leaders, one of whom told me that he deeply respected the 
“institution” (rabop) of the BMA, but not those who currently staffed its offi ces. 
While Thai bureaucratic and political life is indeed marked by strongly 
hierarchical social arrangements, the impetus for democratic reform also has a long 
history. The emergence of a middle class sympathetic to, and indeed committed to, 
NGO interventions, but also jealous of its new gains, has progressively reinforced 
both tendencies. The NGO movement itself displays some of this internal paradox 
(see Missingham 2003). More generally, I have argued elsewhere (Herzfeld 2012) 
that Thai political culture is marked by a tension – or perhaps “oscillation,” recalling 
Leach’s (1954: 8–10 et passim) analysis of political and cultural dynamics in 
Highland Burma – between extremes of egalitarianism (“democracy”) and hierarchy 
(“feudalism”). In contemporary cultural terms this means that one swing of the 
pendulum identifi es “Thainess” (khwaam pen thai) with centralized authoritarian 
rule, while the reverse swing allows local communities to invoke the same ideal of 
Thainess in order to attack what they treat as the “un-Thai” and “uncompassionate” 
(and hence “un-Buddhist”) indifference of some functionaries, especially of those 
who clearly do have considerable power at their disposal.
Thailand has a long history of experimenting with democratic systems. But 
the fact that communities have to resort to the rhetoric of Thainess means that, for 
all intents and purposes, they are always forced to calibrate their local history to a 
national standard. It would be easy to treat this as simply a form of acquiescence 
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in a dominant national discourse. The proliferation of formal temple and palace 
architecture on Rattanakosin Island and the relative dearth of vernacular architectural 
forms strengthen this sense of a national “high culture” to which all else must be 
adumbrated. It is obvious that no community is going to get far by resisting the 
formal image thus generated. 
What local people do resist is the separation of functions I have called “spatial 
cleansing” whereby religious, commercial, and social spheres are separated from 
each other in a legalistic logic that culminated in a court decision to deny the people 
of the Pom Mahakan community the right to remain as residents in a public park, on 
the grounds that private residences and public parks were mutually incompatible. In 
other words, while they may accept and even embrace the outward forms of offi cial 
Thainess, they rework its socio-political implications by disrupting and delaying the 
processes by which offi cialdom promotes it. In part this is just a matter of “buying 
time” (seua welaa); in part it consists of tactically using the forms of offi cial discourse 
and style while pursuing locally relevant ways of living together.
The emergence of Pom Mahakan as a compact, largely consensual community 
doubtless owes a great deal to the pressures exerted on it by the authorities.1 Its 
claims to being a community are contested in various ways; one BMA offi cial told 
me, for example, that it was not a real community in the traditional Thai sense since 
its inhabitants were not united by a common profession (such as the production 
of begging bowls or paper umbrellas, to cite two well-known examples that fi t 
this criterion). Yet it is important to remember that the term chumchon is itself a 
neologism in the Thai context (Anan 2001: 111); indeed, one well-informed local 
commentator who has had active interests in the Rattanakosin development has 
repeatedly told me that he does not know what the word means or whether such a 
thing really exists (although he was more willing to concede that it did in the case 
of Pom Mahakan than in those of some of the middle-class and politically more 
fractious districts such as Phraeng Phutorn or Wat Saket). 
That said, the claim to identity as a community is often made in terms that 
model offi cial discourse. In one attempt to contest the right of the BMA to evict the 
residents in favor of a public park (suan sattharana), the residents constructed their 
own garden (also suan), neatly labeled as a collective achievement with elegant 
greenery forming the letters that proudly announced the community’s name. And 
in an invocation of the newly fashionable concept of “local knowledge,” a concept 
originally popularized by anthropologists such as Anan Ganjanapan and more 
recently coopted by, or made to resemble, offi cial discourse in much the same way 
as has happened with “local history” (see Thongchai 2001), the residents erected 
an A-frame community museum with the inevitable stylized gable fi nials and a 
1 The story of the Pom Mahakan community’s struggle against collective eviction, now over two 
decades long, has been the subject of considerable media attention. Scholarly and activist accounts 
include Ariya n.d.; Bristol 2009; Chatri n.d.; Herzfeld 2003, 2006, 2012; Thanapon 2007.
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Figure 1. Pom Mahakan: A venerable house overlooking the community’s meeting space (photo: the author)
Figure 2. Vernacular architecture and community renewal (photo: the author)
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Figure 3. Modalities of heritage: handicraft and the old city wall (photo: the author)  
Figure 4. Spiritual symbiosis: a new home for the spirits, and old home for the living (photo: the author)
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formal red shingle with gold lettering that read “pavilion of the community’s local 
knowledge” (saalaa phumipanyaa chumchon) (Figure 4). Local acquiescence in this 
offi cializing discourse (Bourdieu 1977:40) does not automatically mean conformity 
with its semantics, but it does entail a risk of cooptation. One should ask how far even 
the well-intentioned recognition of local knowledge might represent a successful 
imposition, however strongly resisted from within, of an interpretative framing 
that reproduces the hierarchical colonization of knowledge that has been analyzed in 
many colonial and postcolonial settings (e.g., Gupta 1998; Raheja 1996).
Like the idea of “community” (which is not without its local critics), the 
contested nature of “Thainess” also feeds off an internal paradox: in its very nativism, 
it exemplifi es a conceptual framework of largely foreign origin. The diffi culty 
any critical analysis must face is indeed the fact that much of the vocabulary of 
resistance to offi cial forms is similarly derived from external sources; it, too, in this 
sense risks being crypto-colonial.2 Yet with that proviso in mind, we can still attempt the 
analysis on the grounds that such devices are arguably the only viable responses to the 
overweening power of state and municipal authorities. Those authorities, moreover, are 
openly claimed (in the persons of the modernizing monarchs Rama IV and Rama V) as 
having directed the process whereby Western civilizational models became the norm.
Such efforts were spectacularly successful. While – in both ideology and 
architecture, which reinforce each other’s messages – national rhetoric does sport 
elements that local and foreign people can easily recognize as stereotypically 
Thai (such as the gable fi nials on the community museum), that very conceit of 
2 “Crypto-colonial” countries claim to have avoided colonial domination but in reality are heavily 
dependent on, and indirectly but materially subject to, intrusive control by Western colonial 
powers. The term signals “the curious alchemy whereby certain countries, buffer zones between the 
colonized lands and those as yet untamed, were compelled to acquire their political independence 
at the expense of massive economic dependence, this relationship being articulated in the iconic 
guise of aggressively national culture fashioned to suit foreign models. Such countries were and 
are living paradoxes: they are nominally independent, but that independence comes at the price of 
a sometimes humiliating form of effective dependence” (Herzfeld 2002: 900–1).
Figure 5. The Pavilion of the Community’s Local Knowledge (photo: the author)
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homogeneity is an imitation of the European model of “national culture” as a common 
possession (on which see especially Handler 1985; Macdonald 2013). This imitative 
capacity – an affectation of Occidentalism that in any postcolonial society would 
easily be recognized as a remnant of “colonial mimicry” (Bhabha 1994: 85–92) – is 
a clear sign that Thailand, for all its vaunted independence from the might of the 
colonial powers, has actually, for most of its modern history, accepted as a condition 
of national survival a thoroughly Western-derived concept of the nation-state as 
bounded by clear frontiers (Thongchai 1994) that contain within themselves a single 
national culture led by a self-appointed but foreign-supported elite. 
The physical manifestations of that dependent condition are everywhere to 
be seen in the area of the Rattanakosin Island project. Just as Greece, that other 
paradigmatic case of “crypto-colonialism” according to my original formulation of 
the concept (Herzfeld 2002), used neo-Classical architecture to create the illusion 
that the people’s hearts and minds were already wedded to a national image closer 
to Bavarian fantasies of high antiquity than to their own everyday experiences in the 
present, so also in Thailand the relentless pursuit of the “typical” Thai architecture 
was a way of clothing, perhaps even of straitjacketing, the body politic by wrapping 
it tightly in a uniform representation of temple architecture. But such strategies 
have a way of backfi ring simply because they provide effective cover for all sorts 
of reassessment. In Greece today the ancient past is invoked against the dominant, 
Eurocentric rhetoric of power by increasingly vocal critics of the country’s current, 
humiliating status (see Plantzos 2012). Invocations of Thainess by the marginalized 
residents of Rattanakosin Island may similarly suggest a concealed capacity for 
inverting long-established meanings from behind the cover of apparent conformity 
with offi cial cultural norms.
The implications of crypto-colonialism as a concept deserve a brief parenthetical 
word of explanation. When I originally coined the term, I knew far more about the 
Greek case than the Thai, and so I was fascinated by the speed with which Thai 
scholars and journalists adopted it. When a journalist became aware of my interest 
in the Rattanakosin Island project, he titled the entire article, complete with a rather 
menacing photograph of this author with videocamera in hand superimposed on 
a shadow drawing of the Temple of the Golden Mount, with the banner headline 
“Crypto-Colonialism: ‘Western Perspective’” (Pornchai 2003). 
The Greeks were far slower to adopt either the terminology or the model, 
reluctant as they perhaps were to admit either to sharing common ground with an 
Asian country or indeed to having submitted at all to the pressures of the Western 
Powers’ colonial schemes. Even in Greece, however, perhaps in part because of 
the naked use of economic force against that country by the so-called troika of 
European institutions, there has lately been a noticeable shift toward considering 
the concept’s relevance to the Greek case (e.g., Plantzos 2011). In Thailand, 
Thongchai Winichakul’s lectures on the topic and his early use of the term (which in 
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publication date precedes my own [Thongchai 2001]) in its Thai form (aanaanikhom 
amphraang) evidently exercised a strong infl uence on the architectural historian 
Woranuch Charungratanapong, whose application of the term to the architecture 
of Rattanakosin Island deserves more consideration because she explicitly links 
stylistic features to the demands of the tourist industry and thus to the economic 
realities undergirding the cultural rhetoric.
The model of crypto-colonialism is not simply a re-hash of older ideas about 
indirect rule, although it more closely approaches recent analyses of the Thai case 
in particular. It is specifi cally a model of cultural imperialism, and that is why it is 
especially germane to the politics of representation involved in historic conservation 
efforts. It does not require its subjects to obliterate all traces of an independent identity. 
On the contrary, what makes it so insidious is that it insists on the glorifi cation of a 
specifi cally national culture. Here, the rhetoric of “heritage” is especially relevant; 
the term moradok haeng chaat stands precisely for this unifying concept. But it is a 
concept that signals its own Western derivation more clearly than it does any strong 
local interest on the part of the citizenry.
Rattanakosin Island – whether in its original form as a national capital calqued 
on the formal Buddhist polity and mandala format of its predecessors in Sukhothai 
and Ayutthaya (see Tambiah 1976: 102–131) or in the Disneyfi ed version envisaged 
in successive Masterplans promulgated by the BMA in association with various 
other bodies – was clearly the emblematic model for a process intended to ramify 
throughout the nation as a whole. Although on the surface the present-day authorities’ 
“high-modernist” (Scott 1998) attempt to reproduce an idealized simulacrum may 
strike purists as a betrayal of the original form of the settlement, it does at least 
share one – albeit ironic – feature with that model: both are devices for securing 
power, whether in the cosmological terms of the old Buddhist polity or in response 
to Western pressure. The difference between the two phases, however, is important. 
First of all, the latter phase is, in Baudrillard’s (1994) terms, deliberately intended as 
a simulacrum of the earlier, but with none of its implications of fl uctuating authority 
(although these may persist among ordinary people). And second, the very idea of 
historic conservation as presently conceived, with its origins in debates that were 
dominated by European thinkers and planners (see, e.g., Macdonald 2013), runs 
counter to Theravada Buddhist understandings of materiality – not so much because 
the material is irrelevant, as because material additions to the fabric may elaborate 
the original design and absorb its sanctity without necessarily allowing the original 
material to be visible at all (Byrne 2007: 153–154).3
3 There is a direct parallel here with Eastern Orthodox Christian practices of encrusting icons 
with gold and silver and repainting them in ever more garish colors and stereotyped outlines. 
Given the parallels between Greece and Thailand noted in this brief essay, further investigation of 
the implications of the parallel might be suggestive in regard to the fate of commemoration and 
conservation under crypto-colonial systems of culture.
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Existing habits did not entirely reject the re-use of older materials, but principles 
of respect for religious buildings demanded ever more elaborate encrustations on 
original structures (or their wholesale replacement), while the preservation of old 
materials for domestic architecture, as in some community projects, owed less to 
archaeological considerations than to the fact that re-use is generally a cheaper 
option. Thus, until recently there were few constraints on radical reconstruction 
and very little painstaking restoration. This tendency was reinforced, in the 
more recent plans, by a desire to create public spaces that had more to do with 
European and North American modernist ideals about parks and traffi c fl ow than 
with the dense social multifunctionality of the older yaan (neighborhoods) of 
Bangkok. 
If colonial planners desired to create a clear demarcation between the 
seemingly aimless “oriental” quarters of local residents and the neatly grid-ordered 
sections intended for the European colonizers (Rabinow 1989), the Thai planners 
were instrumentally involved in the project of convincing Western observers that 
there were, quite simply, no uncivilized “natives” in the new Siam. In this they were 
following a pattern of cultural politics that centered around the goal of achieving 
“civilization” in terms acceptable to the West (Thongchai 2002) – the defi ning 
condition of crypto-colonialism.
Moreover, the Rattanakosin Island project was clearly intended as a model for 
emulation throughout the land, the underlying intention being the homogenization of 
the imagined past of Thailand. The recognition of local peculiarities of architectural 
design did not disguise this overarching translation of a “unity in diversity” model 
of national identity into architectural terms.4 Indeed, the clearest evidence of that 
intention lies in the progressive transformation of the original Rattanakosin Island 
Committee, which was initially charged solely, if exclusively, with the restoration of 
the old dynastic capital to its former glory, into a committee responsible for all the 
historic cities (“old cities,” moeang kao) of the Kingdom.
The cultural attitudes thus evidenced have not changed very much in the past 
century or more. Stylized Thai motifs and haughty bureaucrats remain the expected 
norm; people and objects conform to established expectations, or are at least perceived 
to do so. Occasionally the authorities overstep the limits of credibility, as when the 
Thaksin administration tried to enforce the use of itinerant food vendors’ handcarts 
with stylized Thai ornamentation (especially that of self-exoticizing “spirit hooks”); 
these were hardly practical, and the vendors basically voted with their feet and the 
project was quickly allowed to wither away. But by and large the cultural models 
4 It is worth noting that the construction of highly material images of Thai culture were given 
strong impetus by Luang Wichit Wathakan (Byrne 2009: 84; Wong 2006: 60), who was also 
strongly infl uenced by Italian fascism – a doctrine that countenanced enormous regional variation 
by treating this aspect of Italian culture as expressive of a transcendent unity and genius (see also, 
variously, Barmé 1993; Herzfeld 2005: 107–108).
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still remain those of a crypto-colonial system, with European classicism defi ning 
“structure” and stereotypically Thai ornament the “surface.” 
The Corinthian capitals that grace the interior of the Rattanakosin Hotel in 
combination with murals depicting temples and palaces of clearly and aggressively 
Siamese design (Figure 6) offer a striking illustration of this mixture, in close 
association with the royal name (the hotel is called “Royal Hotel” in English) and 
a location in the heart of Rattanakosin Island, just where Ratchadamnoen Avenue 
ends at the holy royal ground of Sanam Luang. There is a nice irony in the use of a 
Greek architectural feature in a Thai hotel, especially in such a symbolically dense 
location; it is a feature that the colonial esthetic had already transformed considerably 
from the original Greek model, but its presence is an unmistakable sign of that same 
esthetic’s penetration of Thai taste (much as similar devices appear around the globe 
in colonial and post-colonial architecture).
Architecture gives an impression of permanence, but that rhetorical claim 
must be re-cast in each religious, ideological, and cultural context according to local 
concepts of time. What is projected here is supposedly an image of the Thai polity 
and of Thai culture that defi es the corrosion of temporality but that also, consistently 
with Buddhist teachings about the impermanence of the material world, transcends 
the mere physicality of its realization as a built environment. One supposes that 
the anticipated destruction of trees and shrines (e.g., Figure 7) deemed sacred by 
Pom Mahakan residents slated for eviction would also not be justifi ed in terms of 
Figure 6. A meeting of two crypto-colonies: “Greek columns” and the Siamese city (photo: the author)
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the irrelevance of the material, but on the grounds of the presumed incapacity of 
such humble objects to contribute to the highly material streamlining of the image 
of Thai culture (see Byrne 2009: 84). To the residents, by contrast, such moves are 
simply sacrilegious, and an attack on their standing as a representative fraction of the 
Thai nation. In the same way, the rabop of municipal administration transcends the 
alleged iniquities of those who staff the institutional framework, permitting popular 
judgment on their performance even though such judgments rarely translate into 
popularly generated reform. They do, however, frequently translate into resistance.
That resistance is perhaps the most forceful of numerous and increasingly 
insistent signs that the “feudal” image of municipal management in Bangkok 
has slowly begun to change, as local communities challenge the authority of the 
municipal leadership and as much clearer patterns of class confl ict have emerged 
from 2009 on. Moreover, with regard to historic conservation, several academic 
planners and architects have expressed strong views in favor of a more inclusive 
conservation policy, recognizing the signifi cance of vernacular architecture and of 
minority styles. Yet the subservience of the Siamese state to “Western” interests in 
the nineteenth century lives on for the moment in a pattern of emulation that typifi es 
the crypto-colonial cultural regime; even when they argue for the preservation of 
old houses – a diffi cult task in a city where even the powerful have found this to 
be an uphill battle and where the majority of residents simply have no desire to 
inhabit elderly dwellings – they must do so in terms of a chronology that is set by the 
Figure 7. Ancestral presence, threatened future (photo: the author)
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sequence of “reigns” (rachakaan) rather than of artistic styles or popular events.5 At 
the same time, when they turn to plans for renovating or replacing those dwellings 
that are beyond repair, they tend to invoke “tradition” at the same time as they show 
a deeply rooted desire for “Western” domestic arrangements and their attendant 
comforts (Figure 8). 
In Pom Mahakan, for example, there has been a great deal of discussion (from 
2004 on) about what kinds of house would replace the slum dwellings if and when 
the residents dared to attempt that transformation. While there was some sentiment 
in favor of row houses, a design familiar from the Chinese-inspired shophouses 
of other parts of Rattanakosin Island, the interiors were to be furnished in largely 
Western style. In this way, just as in the BMA’s own offi cial plans royal models of 
temples and palaces were to be combined with a Haussmanesque understanding 
of the military advantages of clearing away narrow, winding streets and focusing 
the whole area toward a broad central avenue (the “Champs-Elysées of Asia”), so 
the residents of Pom Mahakan sought salvation in calibrating a few spectacularly 
beautiful or well-preserved houses to the royal chronology – and to a broader sense 
of world history by means of their formal designation as “ancient houses” (baan 
5 This is the way in which the history of architecture is taught, implying, not inaccurately, that 
the monarchy provided the lead in determining esthetic principles and changes; although some 
vernacular architecture appears in the standard works, it is clearly dependent on more aristocratic 
models. See characteristically Phusadee 2002a, 2002b, 2003a, 2003b.
Figure 8. Modernist dreams of the future: a model house at Pom Mahakan (photo: the author)
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boraan) – while bringing to their own dwellings the accoutrements of a materially 
comfortable “civilization.”
What is the solution? In a very real sense, the authorities have now been hoist 
by their own petard, at least in the case of Pom Mahakan. In a country where earlier 
ages saw no great interest in what is today called heritage, the desire to emulate an 
imagined West – but on Thai terms – has created a hybrid cultural and conservationist 
ideology. Because the driving desire is to create monuments to a unifi ed national 
culture, this is the rhetoric – as well as the practice – that infuses resistance to 
authority and critiques of its legitimacy. Just as Greek owners of old houses learn to 
play on the authorities’ sensibilities about “Turkish” versus “European” elements in 
their culture in order to achieve either demolition (in the fi rst case) or refurbishment 
(in the second) (Herzfeld 1991), so the people of Rattanakosin Island, led by what 
was originally the poorest and weakest of communities, have learned under pressure 
how to play the game of nationalist emulation – an emulation that, in a crypto-
colonial situation, itself emulates external models and so compromises the very goal 
of cultural independence.
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